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In the light of the increasing quantity of funds being raised in the London capital markets 
and elsewhere in the form of securitised Islamic bond issues, this article considers a range 
of key factors. What is a securitised bond and what types of Islamic financial 
arrangement can be used to provide the income stream to provide the repayment and 
return on such a bond? What is the difference between a traditional asset backed 
securitisation and an Islamic one, what is the difference between the structures used and 
how does this affect the issue? Other key elements are: the choice of law and jurisdiction 
utilised, pricing models, the extent to which a secondary market can function for such 
bonds, credit enhancement and whether it is possible to develop an Islamic securitisation 
utilizing derivatives to facilitate hedging any currency risk between the originator’s 
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Asset backed or asset based?  
If one of the methods discussed in part one of this article is used as part of a securitisation 
structure there results an argument as to whether such an arrangement should be an asset 
backed on asset based structure
4
. The asset in the context of a traditional securitisation 
will be the income transferred from the originator to the SPV.  If it can be structured on 
this basis then an Islamic securitisation can function in all other aspects as a non-Islamic 
one. However, if ownership of the underlying asset must be transferred then it would no 
longer be a traditional asset backed securitization
5
. In either case it is vital that there is 
insulation between the originator and the SPV for insolvency purposes. If not, then the 
advantages potentially available for a higher credit rating for the SPV and its sukuk issue 
than the originator disappears. Thus, if the securitisation is asset based the rating of the 
originator and its future income become affected by exposure to those underlying risks. 
The AAOIFI’s view is that sukuk certificates must give “…a common title to shares and 





 permit allowing the repurchase of assets at market 
price or at an agreed price at the time of repurchase. Such arrangements are also utilized 
by the ISDA/ IIFM Master Agreement which is discussed below. The history of such 
                                                 
4 See for example the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions  (AAOIFI) 
2008 pronouncement that Islamic securitisation can be asset backed and the Islamic Financial Services 
Board’s edict that it should not be, (Standard 7, 2009). For a useful discussion see Manjou FA “The Ping-
Pong of the Asset-Backed/ Asset-Based Sukuk Debate and the Way Forward.” In Kamal MH and Abdullah 
AK ibid. 
5 In the UK this requires rending the transfer immune to a claim by any future liquidator of the Originator 
under any of sections 178(1), 186(1), 238, 239 or 423 Insolvency Act 1986 or the equivalent if it is another 
jurisdiction. 
6 See for example Moody’s credit rating of First Gulf Bank. Moody’s Investors Services. 




arrangements is quite short with the first being issued in 1990 by Shell MDS and total 





As explained, the assets financing the sukuk issue must be shariah complaint. This has 
led to a degree of inventiveness in parts of the market place to maximize those available. 
This can be done by blending assets, some of which can be non-compliant by the use of 
non-physical (non-cash) assets
9
 for up to 70% of the finance
10
. These ‘asset light’ and 
blended structures have been banned by the AAOIFI
11
 but still seem evident in the 
market place. The key factor arising is the percentage a particular Islamic school will 
permit. The Malaysian Government have sought to resolve any problems by developing 
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   Receivables                    Transfer of ownership of income  
                                            stream to finance bond issue 
   Originator
13
                                                                                      SPV                                                                                            
                                                                                                             
                        26% proceeds to buy Shariah complaint assets                  Sukuk issue 
                                                                                
                           Further 26% proceeds to buy shares 
                                    
                              Remaining 48% proceeds to buy                  Sukuk holders 
                            Shariah compliant commodities to be leased  
                            and then sold to the Originator after a set term 
 
Thus an adapted securitisation structure can be used to satisfy the requirements of  
Islamic Shafi law. 
 
Types of sukuk 
Today Islamic sukuk have similar characteristics to conventional asset backed securities 
issued by a SPV under a securitisation transaction.  Akin to ‘pass through’ certificates, 
the sukuk represent an ownership interest in the underlying asset(s) or its usufruct.  More 
elaborately, they are
14
: “[c]ertificates of equal value representing after closing 
subscription, receipt of the value of the certificates and putting it to use as planned, 
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common title to shares and rights in tangible assets, usufructs and services, or equity of a 
given project or equity of a special investment activity.” 
 
They are generally categorised as either asset-backed sukuk, which offer fairly 
predictable returns to their holders based on the underlying asset; or asset based bonds, 
which offers less predictable returns due to the profit and loss sharing in the underlying 
investment
15
.  They fall into their respective category based on the type of agreement that 
is used to structure the sukuk.  
 
Notwithstanding the similarities many Islamic sukuk differ from conventional asset 
backed securities in two respects.  Firstly, they are not viewed as contractual debt 
obligations of an issuer obliged to pay holders interest and principal on specified dates, 
rather they are claims to an undivided beneficial ownership in the underlying assets.  
Thus, the sukuk holders are entitled to share in the cashflow generated by the underlying 
assets in addition to being entitled to share in the proceeds of the realisation of the 
underlying assets.  The second disparity is that not all sukuk are tradeable on the 
secondary market. This is discussed below.   
 
Also, the issuing of sukuk as part of the securitisation structure raises other 
Islamic law issues. Asset backed securities are permissible under Shariah law provided 
they represent claims against individual assets and securitisations normally represent a 
claim against individual assets which have been pooled which should be acceptable. In 
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addition, bonds are normally issued at a rate of interest whilst on a shariah issue the 
sukuk will need to be performance linked. An Islamic securitisation structure can be used 
under which the holders possess an “undisclosed beneficial ownership in the underlying 
assets and a share in the revenues generated by the sukuk as well as a share in the 
proceeds upon realization.”
16
 Usami defines them as:
17
 “…certificates issued in the name 
of the owner or bearer in order to establish the claim of the certificate owner over the 
financial rights and obligations represented by the certificate. Sukuk represents a 
common share in the ownership of the assets made available for investment, whether 
these are non monetary assets, usufructs, services or a mixture of al these plus intangible 
rights, debts and monetary assets. These sukuk do not represent a debt owed to the issuer 
by the certificate holder.” 
 
It should be added that some of the critical scholars
18
 regard this as essentially un 
Islamic because the issues often base themselves on common interest rates, e.g., LIBOR. 
Certainly such sukuk have in some cases defaulted precisely because they were structured 
as debt instruments
19
. Islamic sukuk are structured in many ways depending on how the 
parties’ relationship with each other is structured, and the nature and intended ownership 
of the underlying assets.   
 
 
Choice of Law and Jurisdiction 
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Islamic sukuk are often traded in major financial centres such as London, but the assets 
that are used to finance the issues are usually in an Islamic state. That being the case there 
is a potential jurisdictional matter with the key issue being the location of the originator 
and the assets which have been assigned, which may not be in the same place. Even if the 
sukuk have been issued subject to English law and English jurisdiction
20
, any dispute 
arising over payment arising on the insolvency of the originator is likely to end up being 
heard in the court in which the originator was incorporated. Thus, the issue will arise of 






Another problem relates to pricing. When pricing models are created a key element will 
be the short term – long term interest rate spread. Under shariah law of course interest 
rates are not permissible. Putting a notional ‘interest rate’ in for purely pricing model 
purposes would need to include an allowance for the lack of secondary market, which 
would presumably widen the spread. One suggestion
22
 that has been made is for 
institutions in this position is to work out an appropriate ‘rate’ by looking at recent 
private sukuk arrangements entered into by Islamic banks to companies with the same 
credit rating over a short and longer term. This will provide information as to the market 
value of the spread. However, such information will be slightly ‘rule of thumb’. The 
                                                 
20 See ISDA/ IIFA Master Agreement Schedule 
21 Kamadi MH and Abdullak AK ibid 




normal approach with pricing modeling is to apply a specific formula, namely that the 
return on capital is as follows where: 
 




h describe the sensitivity of the asset’s return to each of a list of factors, and 
E(R factor 1)…E(R factor k) are the expected rate of return on each of a number of factors. 
                             
E(R1) = R1  + B
1
i  [E(R factor 1) – Rj ] + ….+ B
h
i [E(R factor k) – Rj ] 
 
To calibrate this it is necessary to discern the relevant factors. There are generally seen
23
 
as being four key ones: industrial activity, inflation, short term – long term rate of return 
spread and low risk – high risk corporate bond spread. 
 
In an Islamic economy these are no more difficult to determine than they would 
be in a non Islamic economy. The relevant government’s gross domestic product will 
cover the first, inflation is normally dealt with in annual monthly government figures, but 
the third becomes more interesting. All other factors being equal; the greater the spread 
between short term and long term rates, the higher the return will need to be. The fourth 
of these relates to the rate of return across different periods of time, not across different 
levels of credit risk amongst the borrowers. As discussed above, this is not permitted by 
shariah law. In practice though, the fact that some firms are less attractive as a credit risk 
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does tend to be reflected in the rates of profit that are shared with investors. This, in turn 
gets reflected in the notional term rate figures. 
 
Another problem that could arise in this context is that which precipitated the 
collapse of Northern Rock Bank in the UK; namely the drying up of the securitised bond 
market which in that instance partly resulted from the crisis in the U.S. sub prime market. 
For an Islamic bank this type of potential risk is greater because of the lack of an active 
secondary market in the sukuk, which in turn will make those purchasing the sukuk more 
cautious about the assets behind the loan. This will be accentuated if it is an asset based 
securitisation as the lenders’ exposure to the assets behind the originator is much more 
obvious. Purchasers are therefore going to be limited to those willing to hold them to 
maturity, and this in turn will shorten the range of periods over which the bonds can be 
issued. This leads to an increase in the number of sequential bond issues that will have to 
be made to cover medium and long term loans made by the bank and as a result the issuer 
becomes exposed to the long term risk of the market into which the SPV must make 
recurrent sukuk issues. 
 
Secondary bond markets 
Illiquidity however remains a key problem with Islamic sukuk as there is no effective 
second hand market. This is because a sukuk that represents a debt to the holder cannot 
be traded under shariah law, for a debt cannot normally be traded for amount other than 
its face value. Rather the holder is often effectively obligated to hold the sukuk until 




that shariah law only permits the holding of sukuk that reflect a direct interest in an 
underlying asset and that a debt can normally only be sold on at its full value. That said, 
the latter point would not be an issue for many of those buying sukuk in a jurisdiction 
that does not apply Islamic law such as England and Wales. Unlike shares, which some 
Islamic scholars accept as undivided ownership of a company’s real assets, sukuk tend to 
reflect a generic interest in underlying assets. Some Islamic scholars
24
 are adopting a 
constructive approach regarding this issue, but for the time being a significant secondary 
market does not exist in the way it does for western style corporate bonds. There are 
however steps being taken to develop the second hand market. To the extent that there is 
a secondary market it tends to operate largely at country and regional levels because of 
the lack of cross border infrastructure that would facilitate trading
25
. At present liquidity 
platforms are being created, eg, in Bahrain, but the problem remains and fears of a lack of 
capacity to sell sukuk in the secondary market inevitably depresses the price at which the 
sukuk issue can be launched. To be tradeable there needs to be the capacity to transfer 
ownership of the right to the underlying asset or the proceeds thereof. Sukuk satisfying 
the AAOFII definition
26
 ought to be able to achieve this. It requires that the “…manager 
issuing sukuk must certify the transfer of ownership of such assets…and not keep them as 
his own assets.” 
 
                                                 
24 Dato N.Z. and Zaky Y. “An Islamic Perspective of Stock Markets  - an Introduction” ed Abod S.G. 1992 
and Mannan M.A. “Understanding Islamic Finance: A Study of the Securities Market in an Islamic 
Framework”, Jedda, Islamic Development Bank, 1988. 
25 Shah NS. The Financial Ambassador of the Malaysian International Islamic Financial Centre. Speech, 
Kuala Lumpur, 12th November 2013 




As mentioned, sukuk can normally only be traded on a secondary market at par 
value. At this price in normal market conditions there would be no economic incentive 
for anyone to buy. However, there is an exception where the sukuk issue is financed by 
physical assets. As such assets can be sold as a discount so can any sukuk that represent 
them.  
 
There was a particular problem a few year ago when the US $ declined in value 
and some of the Arab States decoupled their exchange rate from the US$, and as shariah 
sukuk issues were often denominated in US $ there was a consequential currency risk for 
the sukuk holders. The normal hedging arrangements that non Islamic bodies use to 
hedge currency risk: (futures, options and contracts for differences), are not normally 
available to them. So, in Islamic securitised sukuk issues the sukuk has to be 
denominated in the same currency as the originator’s or either the originator or bond 
holder would have to carry a currency risk. In many cases both would end up doing so as 
the originator of an Islamic securitisation will not normally be earning its income in US$ 
and the sukuk holder is risking a decline in the value of the originator’s currency which 
would reduce the value of any assets used by the originator to back the sukuk issue. This 
would be a particular problem in the event of the originator’s insolvency with an asset 
based securitisation. At a time of currency unpredictability it is insufficient to hedge in a 
currency that is pegged to the currency concerned as the peg may be broken. With a 
possible rise in US interest rates being on the horizon this risk may well reverse itself. In 
any event there is a method of hedging currency risk that is acceptable to Islamic Shafi 





Thus, securitisation provides a safer investment than a traditional sukuk in the 
event of solvency problems
27
. To quote Ghani
28
 “People have to remember that most 
sukuk are unsecured investment instruments….Those assets are there to facilitate a 
financial obligation of the issuers. They are not there to provide security to the investors”.  
However, the point with traditional securitisation is in the event of non-payment the 
bondholders would be looking to the assets that had been transferred to the SPV to 
provide the payment.  
 
Credit Enhancement 
As Islamic law does not allow contracts which involve excessive risk, issues can arise 
with regard to credit enhancement arrangements which most commonly takes the form of 
over collateralization in the calculation of the debt to be transferred to the SPV relative to 
the sum raised by the bond issue. It can also take the form of risk participation where a 
surety is paid a fee in return for an undertaking to cover any shortfall if the income being 
underwritten does not materialize or does not do so in full. 
 
It has also been suggested that the requirement that the seller should have 
possession at the time the contract for sale is entered into can be settled by reference to 
prevailing custom. It has been argued that in a modern capital market that this can be 
                                                 
27 Kamali M H and Abdullah A K. “Islamic Finance: Issues in Sukuk.” The Islamic Foundation p 5 




satisfied by actual or constructive possession
29
. Some Islamic schools adopt a more 
liberal approach and thus the Shariah Board will have the last word on whether a 
particular credit enhancement arrangement is permissible
30
. This leaves over 
collateralisation as the safest arrangement to satisfy this requirement. Thus, the originator 
will provide more than 100% of the amount anticipated as the sum required to service the 
costs of the sukuk issue, interest payments and repayment. Other steps that have been 
taken to make the potential sukuk purchasers feel secure are for the originator to agree to 
maintain gearing ratios, to maintain a stated debt service coverage ratio and not to declare 
a dividend in a year when the debt service coverage ratio falls below a certain figure. 
This all tends to assist with the credit rating given to the sukuk issue. 
  
It is sometimes the case that a double special purpose vehicle will be adopted in 
cases where over collateralisation is being used to assist in obtaining a good credit rating. 
In such cases the initial transfer of the receivables will be from the originator to SPV 1. 
This will be a true sale for the purposes of insolvency risk
31
. The receivables are then 
transferred to SPV 2 on a true sale basis for the accounting rules. SPV 2 will then issue 
the bonds. When the arrangement is eventually terminated SPV 2 will re-transfer any 
outstanding receivables to SPV 1 which can then be hived up into the Originator
32
. The 
reason for doing this may be that there is a dichotomy between the time when the assets 
will be received by the SPV and the later date at which the sukuk will be issued. SPV 1 
                                                 
29 Sharia’h Standards AAOIFI, 2003. Chapter 1. For a general discussion see Uberoi P and Khadem AR 
“Islamic Derivatives: Past, Present and Future” in Hassan MK and Malknecht M “Islamic Capital Markets” 
Wiley, Chichester, 2011, p149 
30 This does not just invoke signing off the original documentation but also an ongoing review of the 
documentation and contracts and their implementation. AAOIFI Shariah Standard No 17. 
31 see FRS 5 




can be used as a ‘warehouse’ for the income being transferred from the originator in the 
interim. Where there is no such delay, the same structure may be used where the 
originator is seeking to dispose of the assets and sell them to a third party via a 
securitisation. An SPV subsidiary may be established to purchase and on sell the assets to 
a securitisation vehicle. This could be used to restructure the form of the assets either to 
make them marketable to certain types of fund or to restructure the assets into a form that 
can be on sold to Islamic buyers. A second SPV could also be necessitated because of 
regulatory necessity in having either the originator, a sponsor or a lender holding a 
specified legal interest
33
. This structure has not apparently arisen yet in Islamic 
securitisations, but there would not appear to be any legal barrier from them doing so. 
 
Currency hedging under Shariah law 
In some instances it may be difficult to get a securitisation structure to operate effectively 
because the sukuk need to be issued in a currency other than the currency used in the 
originator’s income stream. To resolve this problem some securitisations have utilised 
contracts for differences between the originator and the SPV. The reason for this is that 
the proceeds of the sukuk issue are in a different currency than the income of the 
originator and it does not wish to leave the currency risk unhedged. Matters are further 
complicated by the fact that most of the Islamic states where sukuk issues may be made 
from are not ones which have attractive currencies which foreign investors may be 
attracted to holding. In the case of securitised sukuk issues the originator’s income will 
be in that currency which will impact on the credit rating of the final issue.  
                                                 




           Islamic law debars the sale of anything not already in existence. However, there is 
some flexibility on this point. Some Islamic jurists suggest that it is possible to sell an 
item that is not yet owned by the seller as long as it is in existence. The logic supporting 
such an arrangement that is acceptable under Islamic law is that what is being sold is the 
promise to sell. The sale item is simply the object of this. The arrangement is thus the 




The process used here is that an Islamic form of a contract for differences is used 
between the SPV’s bankers and the issuer. In this instance a contract is signed whereby 
the SPV arranges with a bank to enter into a contract for differences  whereby the net 
difference between the proceeds of the sukuk sales in one currency are ‘swapped’ against 
an agreed sum in the currency which the originator wishes to acquire. At the date of 
repayment of the bonds the contract for differences will re-swap the relevant amounts. 
Clearly this will involve the SPV in costs to finance the arrangement and the originator 
will need to factor this cost in from the outset. This can also be an advantage if the 
jurisdiction in which the relevant parties are located would impose stamp duty on a 
transfer of the funds. Contracts for differences are normally immune from this. Thus: 
 
FIGURE 4  
 




              pool of 
                                                 
34 Brunschvig R “Corps certain et chose de genre dans l’obligation en droit musukman” in Etudes 
d’Islamologie. Maisonneve et Larose, Paris, 1976 vol II p 305-6 




           receivables 
                    
              $ 
                           Transfer of ownership of income stream 
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                                                                                   sukuk holders 
 
This is a problem in Islamic securitisation as derivative contracts such as contracts 
for differences are not traditionally permitted. The bases of this objection are that the 
arrangement amounts to a type of gaming, that in may in some cases be uncertain in 
financial outcome and it may also allow one party to buy or sell, even if notionally, an 
asset that does not exist at the time of the contract
36
.  However, it may be possible in 
Shafi Islamic jurisdictions to create an equivalent state of affairs. In this context what is 
required is a cross currency swap. This is in essence a contract where party A borrows in 
one currency, usually because they can access the currency cheaply due to being based in 
that jurisdiction and party B does likewise in its jurisdiction. The parties can then ‘swap’ 
                                                 




their respective currency positions and each then access the foreign currency at a lower 
rate than they could have accessed it directly
37
. In practice this usually now consists of a 
bank creating such an arrangement and borrowing one of the currencies themselves. They 
will then enter into a deal with a counterparty and the netted off difference between the 
two currency sums will be settled periodically during the period of the contract
38
. In 
practice the SPV’s local bank and the banker in the jurisdiction from which the sukuk are 
issued (which may be the same one) will adopt a version of this covered by the ISDA/ 
IIFM Master Agreement which satisfies the Shafi school of Islamic law. As the two sums 
have the same value at the outset that part of the arrangement should not present 
problems under Islamic law. The second stage is the key problem. The future interest 





 Master Agreement helps resolve this problem for the purposes 
of hedging
40
, which in this context requires a tangible transaction
41
. The Master 
Agreement is an overall 
42
agreement under which a succession of contracts are entered 
into between two parties. A main benefit of this is that all the contracts can potentially be 
                                                 
37 Hudson A. “The Law on Financial Derivatives”. Thomson: Sweet & Maxwell, London. 2006, p47. See 
also Price JAM and Henderson SK “Currency and Inerest Rate Swaps”. Butterworths, London. 1998, p 16 - 
18 
38 Haynes A, The Law Relating to International Banking. London, 2010, p47 
39 International Securities and Derivatives Association and the International Islamic Financial Market 
produced both the Tahawwut Master Agreement and the two templates for Islamic profit rate swaps in 
2010. 
40 ISDA/IIFM Taharwwt Master Agreement (2010) for Islamic Cross Currency Swaps (Himaayah 
MinTaqallub As’aar Assarf) Explanatory Memorandum, section 2 
41 Uberoi P and Khaten AR “Islamic Derivatives, Past, Present and Future” p 155 in Hassan MK and 
Mahlknecht M “Islamic Capital Markets” Wiley and Sons, Chichester 2011 






 against each other in the event of one party becoming insolvent, thus greatly 
reducing the amount of capital each party is putting at risk. As in the interim only the net 
balance is ever at risk this hugely increases the amount of capital the counterparties can 
risk tying up in such contracts. However, due to the requirements of Islamic law two 
agreements rather than one are needed. This consists of an undertaking
44
 made by the 
buyer of the asset (in this case a currency) to the other that they will fulfill their part of 
the arrangement and buy at the agreed price, or the formula by which the price will be 
calculated. A murabaha Asset Sale Confirmation must be signed at the time of sale. An 
equivalent contractual arrangement is entered into by the seller. This arrangement will 
cover the initial exchange of currency A for currency B at the start of the contract and the 
final re-exchange at the end. In the case of the ISDA/ IIFA Master Agreement, the 
counterparties will each complete a template under which each party separately 
undertakes to transfer assets (in this case currency) of a particular value to the other and 
received an agreed price (or a formula to calculate the price) plus a profit or loss in 
return. At termination of the contract the assets will be transferred back by both parties. 
 
The originator could thus issue certificates representing the ownership of assets 
creating the relevant future income. The SPV could issue certificates representing the 
sum of money raised from the bond proceeds. These could be notionally ‘swapped’ as the 
bond certificates could be traded for a certificate representing ownership and any 
necessary balancing payment could then be made between the parties to make sure the 
arrangement represented equal values being traded. A key issue would be whether there 
                                                 
43 Shea A. “The usefulness of netting agreements in international banking.” JIBL [1991] p 132 - 138 




was a passing of ownership and risk which is a pre-requisite to most Islamic schools 
accepting the arrangement. It would also be dependant on the sukuk holders effectively 
acquiring an interest in the assets held by the Originator which provide the relevant 
income. The success or failure of the arrangement would thus depend on the wording of 
the relevant master agreement. 
 
Conclusions 
As seen, problems arise because in many jurisdictions there are disparate interpretations 
of how Islamic law should operate. This leaves a securitisation created subject to Islamic 
law open to interpretation if a jurisdiction in which it comes before a court does not take 
the same view as those who drafted the arrangement in another. In part this is a 
consequence of different standards of interpretation of the Islamic religion rather than just 
how it should be applied to finance law. In part also it is a consequence of the fact that 
Islamic jurisprudence is also partly based on the lex juris
45
, the international private law 
developed by legal practitioners in this area. This also differs from region to region as a 
consequence of different religious approaches.  In practice this problem is normally got 
round by making sure the choice of law and jurisdiction clause in the relevant certificates 
is made subject to the law of a state where the Islamic Board of Banking Supervision 
have approved the precise nature of the arrangement being utilised. 
 
                                                 
45 T. Frankel “Securitization, Structured Financing, Financial Asset Pools and Asset-Backed Securities.” 
(1991)  at p3. See also J.H. Dalhuisen “Legal Orders and their Manifestation: The Operation of the 
International Commercial and Financial Legal Order and its Lex Mercatoria.” (2006) 24 Berkley Journal of 




Secondly, there are Islamic theologians who regard much of the attempt to 
construct Islamic securitisations, and indeed other western based financial structures such 
as derivatives, as an artificial manipulation of legal form
46
. This is an argument, that so 
far as modern financial instruments are concerned seems to have been running since the 
1970’s
47
.  As far as this approach is concerned, those taking a stricter line believe that the 
substance of Islamic law is being subverted by a need to satisfy artificial legal forms that 
developed in western law. For example Hamoudi sees constructing western style 
financial structures as “legalistic abstractions” which are the same as “…their forbidden 
counterparts, albeit with semantic alterations….associated with creating the appearance 
of difference.”
48
 He sees the whole approach as sophistry, designed to circumvent the 
provisions of Islamic law. Usmani
49
 regards it as a “legal trick” and sees it as avoiding 
the Islamic economic order. He
50
 goes as far as claiming that 85% of sukuk are not 
shariah compliant. In other words, the very acceptance of western financial and legal 
forms by adapting terminology and dressing the concepts up cannot by its very nature 
satisfy Islamic law. More traditionalistic jurisdictions may therefore not develop a 
securitisation market at all. The constructionists on the other hand see the critical school 
as having no methodology for dealing with many finance law issues. The critical issue in 
any securitised sukuk issue will be the view of the Islamic board of banking supervision 
in the state of issue of the bonds. 
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47 E.g., Council of Ideology (1986) “Consolidated Recommendations on the Islamic Economic System.” 
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49 Usmani MT, “Verdicts on At-Tawarruq and its Banking Applications”. Research paper, International 
Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance. www.kantakji.com/media/7245/a-68-.pdf 




This may be one reason for the failure of a significant secondary market to 
develop in Islamic financial sukuk through a reduction in the number of potential buyers 
for religious reasons. Exacerbating it is the failure of the relevant accountancy regulators 
to develop a precise methodology for determining exactly what an investor has purchased 
as an interest where such investments are concerned
51
. Coupled with this lack of liquidity 
in the market is also the existence of complicated transactional arrangements and the fact 
that relevant risk management strategies are still developing. In the past this has not 
stopped a market developing but until the last two years it has been a market dominated 
by sovereign issuers where the purchasers of the bonds are motivated by the credit rating 




However, there are signs that all these problems are being overcome in practice 
and that Islamic finance in general and Islamic securitisation in addition will continue to 
develop as a significant element in the world of international finance. According to 
Suleiman Abdi Dualeh
53
: “Islamic institutions…have…permitted a philosophy in 
financing based on direct asset financing, rather than lending funds to entities and 
individuals. They have all along suffered from having to deal with financial 
intermediaries whose interest rate products are not Islamically acceptable. Securitisation 
enables Islamic institutions to by pass those shortcomings by engaging themselves 
directly with the assets to be financed and with the investors in pools of these assets. It 
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also enables Islamic institutions to regulate the Islamic acceptability of the terms under 
which the users hold these assets.” 
 
The further development of this market is also affected by the absence of 
governmental organisations facilitating the development of the market. For example, the 








 greatly facilitated the 
development of the securitisation market for bonds issued against the income from 
residential mortgages. This occurred both in the immediate sense of the bond issues 
having a ready market due to the fact that there was effective state backing for the bond 
issues (albeit at the time of the development of the market an implicit one in the case of 
the first two) and also the fact that the scale of development led to the standardisation of 
legal documentation, thus further facilitating the development of the market. There is, as 
yet, no equivalent structure to enhance the shariah securitisation market. Likewise, 
although regulators are recognising shariah sukuk issues there is not the clear cut 
recognition in every state as to where such sukuk issues fit into the regulatory structure, 
although this is starting to change.  
 
Creating a shariah structure requires that the scheme be certified by a recognised 
shariah scholar and there is a shortage of them in some parts of the world, though this is 
less of a problem than it used to be. This tends to slow down the creation of more 
schemes. Legal opinions from such states may not always be available from large, 
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internationally recognised law firms, further constraining the attractiveness of the sukuks 
to potential investors. Related to this is a lack of judicial precedent in interpreting the 
shariah laws in the context of international securitisation issues and that many of the laws 
relating to them passed by states are untested in the courts creating an atmosphere of 
legal uncertainty. This in turn is further exacerbated by the fact that many Islamic states 
do not recognize the concept of trusts, which can inhibit their capacity to utilise 
securitisation, which is a problem if the tax laws and accountancy regulations of the host 
state of the originator do not recognise offshore independent corporate vehicles as outside 
the scope of the originator’s consolidated accounting requirements. In such instances the 
securitisation would only then be able to work by using a trust vehicle as a special 
purpose entity (SPE) to fulfill the function of an SPV. 
 
Turning to current market practice, it is clear that the issues discussed above are 
being overcome, at least to some extent. Securitisations that are shariah compliant are 
becoming a common feature of the current market place, indeed over the last eight years 
it has been one of the fastest growing parts of the capital markets.  The initial 
development was primarily that of sukuk structures incorporating a sovereign credit and 
corporate securitisations later followed
58
. The most widely used structure is the murabaha 
which is a type of sale at a marked up price. The more complex, multi-jurisdictional 
structures tend to involve ljara. Where shariah courts are concerned partnership structures 
are used
59
. The scale of Islamic securitisation is continuing to grow with an estimated 
US$ 44 billion issued in the last year for which full figures for securitized sukuk seem to 
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. However, 60% of this was denominated in Malaysian Ringgit
61
 suggesting 
that the market is predominantly based in one geographical area. Its success there 
suggests that its importance will spread. Since then there is evidence of a slight 
downturn
62
 but as the underlying reasons for this method of debt raising remain strong it 
is reasonable to expect further market expansion. 
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